Game Theory Essay

Game theory emerged as a scholarly field of study in the first half of the 20th century. Since that time, it has significantly affected various academic disciplines, such as economics, political science and biology. Although the term â€Å"game theory† may suggest a certain frivolity, the concepts underlying it have many real-world applications and offer a structured and logical method of considering strategic situations. The parallels between competitive games and strategic business situations should be fairly obvious. Consider the game of chess. There are two players, each of whom makes moves in sequence. After observing the move made by the first player, the second player makes a counter move. Then the first player, having observed the first two moves, makes the third move and so on. Compare this to the business situation of gas stations competing for customers through strategic pricing. (The players in this case are station A and station B. ) Suppose, for instance, that station A starts by choosing a new pricing strategy. Given station A’s decision, station B decides how it will set its prices. Given station B’s response, station A can choose to revise its pricing strategy and so on. The objective of each gas station in this â€Å"game† is to maximise its own profit. For each to do so, it must be continually acting and reacting to its competitor in the market as well as anticipating competitive responses when making decisions. What does game theory have to offer? First, game theory provides a framework, or formal procedure, for analysing any competitive situation (or â€Å"game†). Specifically, it forces you to identify the players in a game (consumers, sellers, input providers, governments, foreign organisations, etc. , their possible actions and reactions to the actions of other players, and the payoffs or rewards implicit in the game. Game theory models reduce the world in which businesses operate from a highly complex one to one that is simpler but nevertheless retains some important characteristics of the original. By capturing and clarifying the most significant aspects of competition and interdependence, game theory models make it possible to break down a complex competitive situation into its key components and to analyse the complex dynamics between players. In order for game theory to be truly useful in analysing such complex situations, certain assumptions need to be made. The most significant assumption is that the players in a game are choosing their actions optimally; that is, they are choosing their actions in the hope of maximising their ultimate payoff and they assume that the other players are doing likewise. Without this assumption, game theory cannot successfully model real-world situations. Because game theory can realistically model business situations, it helps businesses to make optimal decisions and choose optimal actions. In other words, by â€Å"solving† a game, a business can identify its optimal actions (assuming, as always, that all the other players are also choosing their actions optimally). This is especially valuable because it helps companies choose the right business strategies when confronted with a complex strategic situation. In what types of business situations can game theory be applied? Click on the linkhere to find out. The nature of the solution(s) in game theory also motivates businesses to analyse how the structure of the game can be altered so that a different (and perhaps a more favourable) game can be played. Because of its systematic approach, game theory allows businesses to examine the consequences of actions that they may not have considered. It is worth noting here that many games involving business are different from games in other fields. For instance, in business, many players can win (and lose) simultaneously, which obviously is not the case with chess. Additionally, because of the interdependent nature of most business relationships, these games are not always ones of direct competition. Consider a game between manufacturer and supplier — both have incentives to do well, but each also has a vested interest in the success of the other. Furthermore, unlike some other games with fixed rules, the rules of business are continuously in flux. They may be formulated by law, by tradition or by accident. Often, however, players have an influence on how rules are decided. How does game theory differ from microeconomics? Because game theory can be used to model almost any economic situation, it might seem redundant to study both microeconomics and game theory. However, microeconomics tends to focus on cases in which there are many buyers and sellers or there is one seller (or buyer) and many buyers (or sellers). Yet here are many instances in which there are a few buyers or sellers. Markets in which more than one but still only a few firms compete are known as â€Å"oligopolies. † Oligopolists are acutely aware of their interdependence. Each firm’s decisions in the market depend on the specific assumptions it makes about how its rivals make pricing and output decisions. In addition, there are other situations in which there is one buyer and one seller. Microeconomics without game theory does not adequately address these matters. Consider a market in which the number of producers is small. In aircraft manufacturing, two firms, Boeing and Airbus, control 100 percent of the world market for commercial aircraft. Each firm recognises that its pricing and production decisions have important implications for its rival’s profitability. As a consequence, each firm attempts to guess which actions its rival will take. But each must also recognise that its rival will also be guessing as to what it will do. Clearly, such interactions are inadequately represented by classic microeconomic models, which assume that the firms are price takers. In some other markets, the number of buyers is small. For instance, the wholesale market for diamonds is dominated by a small group of global firms; therefore, diamond producers may find that implicit (or explicit) collusion between buyers makes it difficult for the diamond producers to exercise market power. Once again, classic microeconomic models may be missing a very important feature of actual markets. Click on each of the links below to read a few real-world examples in which game theory is applicable.

Course Notes on Principles of Management

The Global Environment In the past, managers have viewed the global sector as closed. Each country or market was assumed to be isolated from others. Firms did not consider global competition, exports. Today’s environment is very different. Managers need to view it as an open market. Organizations buy and sell around the world. Managers need to learn to compete globally. Tariff Barriers A tariff is a barriers to trade. Tariffs are taxes levied upon imports. These seek to protect jobs in the home country. Other countries usually retaliate.Free trade: in a free trade agreement, each country seeks to specialize in things they make most efficiently. If India is more efficient in making textiles, and the USA in making computer software, then each country should focus on these. Distance & Culture Barriers The second leading cause of trade barriers. Distance closed the markets as far as some managers were concerned. Communications could be difficult. Languages and cultures were differ ent. During the last 50 years, communications and transportation technology has dramatically improved.Jet aircraft, fiber optics, satellites have provided fast, secure communications and transportation. These have also reduced cultural differences. Effects on Managers Declining barriers have opened great opportunities for managers. Managers can not only sell goods and services but also buy resources and components globally. Managers now face a more dynamic and exciting job due to global competition. Free Trade NAFTA: North American Free Trade Agreement. Abolishes most tariffs on goods traded between Mexico, Canada and the U. S. Allows unrestricted cross-border flows of resources.Many U. S. firms have now invested in Mexico. This is a manufacturing opportunity. Wage costs are lower in Mexico. Can serve Mexico with a plant in Mexico and reduce freight. Managers face new opportunities and threats. Global Task Environment Suppliers & Distributors Managers buy products from global suppli ers or make items abroad and supply themselves. Key is to keep quality high and costs low. Global outsourcing: firms buy inputs from throughout the world. GM might build engines in Mexico, transmissions in Korea, and seats in the U. S. Finished goods become global products.Distributors: each country often has a unique system of distribution. Managers must identify all the issues. Customers & Competitors Formerly distinct national markets are merging into a huge global market. True for both consumer and business goods. Creates large opportunities. Still, managers often must customize products to fit the culture. McDonald's sells a local soft drink in Brazil. Global competitors present new threats. Increases competition abroad as well as at home. Forces in the Global General Environment Political-Legal ForcesResults from diverse and changing nature of each countries’ political system. Representative democracies: such as the U. S. , Britain, Canada. Citizens elect leaders who ma ke decisions for electorate. Usually has a number of safeguards such as freedom of expression, a fair court system, regular elections, and limited terms for officials. Well defined legal system and economic freedom. Totalitarian regimes: a single political party or person monopolize power in a country. Typically do not recognize or permit opposition. Most safeguards found in a democracy do not exist.Examples include Iran, Iraq, and China. These are difficult to do business with given the lack of economic freedom. Further, human rights issues also cause managers to avoid dealing with these countries. Economic Systems Free market economy: production of goods and services is in private ownership. Production is dictated by supply and demand. Command economy: decisions on what to produce, how much, done by the government. Most command economies are moving away from the command economy. Mixed economy: certain economic sectors controlled by private business, others are government controlle d.Many mixed countries are moving toward a free enterprise system. Recent Trends Current shift away from totalitarian dictators toward democratic regimes. Very dramatic example seen in the collapse of the former Soviet Republic. Also very pronounced in Latin America and Africa. With this shift, has come a strong movement toward free market systems. This provides great opportunities to business managers on a global level. Many businesses are investing millions in former totalitarian countries to seize these opportunities. Changing Political and Economic Forces Sociocultural ForcesNational culture: includes the values, norms, knowledge, beliefs, and other practices that unite a country. Values: abstract ideas about what a society believes to be good, desirable and beautiful. Provides attitudes for democracy, truth, appropriate roles for men, and women. Usually not static but very slow to change. Norms: social rules prescribing behavior in a given situation. Folkways: routine social co nventions including dress codes and manners. Mores: Norms that are central to functioning of society. much more significant that folkways. More examples include theft, adultery, and are often enacted into law.Norms vary from country to country. Hofstede’s Model of National Culture Individualism v. Collectivism Individualism: world view that values individual freedom and self-expression. Usually has a strong belief in personal rights and need to be judged by achievements. Collectivism: world view that values the group over the individual. Widespread in Communism. Prevalent in Japan as well. Managers must understand how their workers relate to this issue. Power Distance A society’s acceptance of differences in the well being of citizens due to differences in heritage, and physical and intellectual capabilities.In high power distance societies, the gap between rich and poor gets very wide. In low power distance societies, any gap between rich and poor is reduced by taxati on and welfare programs. Most western cultures (U. S. , Germany, United Kingdom) have relatively low power distance and high individualism. Many economically poor countries such as Panama, Malaysia have high power distance and low individualism. Achievement vs Nurture Achievement oriented societies value assertiveness, performance, success. The society is results-oriented. Nurturing-oriented value quality of life, personal relationships, service.The U. S. and Japan are achievement-oriented while Sweden, Denmark are more nurturing-oriented. Uncertainty Avoidance Societies and people differ on their willingness to take on risk. Low uncertainty avoidance (U. S. , Hong Kong), value diversity, and tolerate differences. Tolerate a wide range of opinions and beliefs. High uncertainty avoidance (Japan and France) are more rigid and do not tolerate people acting differently. High conformity to norms is expected. Long Term Outlook Long-term outlook is based on values of saving, and persistenc e.Taiwan and Hong Kong are cultures that are long -term in outlook. Short-term outlook seeks the maintenance of personal stability or happiness right now. France and the U. S. are examples of this approach. International Expansion Importing and Exporting: the least complex method of expansion. Exporting: firm makes products and sells abroad. Importing: firm sells products made abroad. Licensing: firm allows foreign organization to make and distribute goods for a fee. Helps the home firm since it does not have to set up a complete production and distribution network.Franchising: company sells a foreign organization the rights to use brand name and know-how in return for payment and profit percentage. International Options Strategic Alliances: managers pool resources with a foreign firm and both organizations share the rewards and risks. Allows firm to maintain control which is a problem with exporting, licensing, and franchising. Wholly-owned foreign subsidiary: firm invests in produ ction operations in a foreign country. Many Japanese auto firms have done this in the U. S. This is very expensive but can yield high returns. International Expansion

Stefan’s Diaries: The Craving Chapter 21

Damon and I remained in the cell for several minutes after the man left, too stunned to even contemplate escaping. The guards didn't come back in with the keys. I didn't blame them. I cursed, slamming the bars. It seemed that no matter what I decided to do, which way I turned, things got worse. And the Sutherlands†¦ they had just been innocent bystanders, swept up in the path of destruction just because they were at the wrong place at the wrong time. While my brother didn't actively cause their deaths, he was no less responsible. I turned on him, ready to tear him apart. And then I saw the look on his face. Damon's eyes had glazed over and he leaned against the wall for support. He'd worn the same dazed expression for weeks after he'd woken up as a vampire and discovered that Katherine was dead. â€Å"What was that?† he whispered, finally looking at me. But I had no idea what that was. All I knew was that it was more powerful, more dangerous, more deadly than any creature I'd ever encountered. Anger at my brother drained away and something like exhaustion set in. â€Å"I'm not sure, though I think he left me a message,† I said, remembering the bloody scrawl on the side of the Sutherlands' home. â€Å"But what was that about Katherine? What was he to her?† Damon shrugged. â€Å"I have no idea. She never told me about that†¦ thing.† â€Å"He said we took her from him. What the hell does that mean? What curse is he talking about? Did Emily cast a spell on someone?† I said. I began to pace, my mind racing. â€Å"I'm guessing it means he believes we killed her. Which you did, brother,† Damon said. In a pique, Damon sat down, stretched his legs out, and put his hands behind his head, pillowing it against the stone. I would get no more answers out of him. I slid down against the bars and buried my head in my hands, thinking of my time with Katherine. Had she ever said anything about her past? Let anything slip? But I had been so completely under her thrall that it was impossible to know what had been real and what she had compelled me to believe. Though I remembered biting her, I didn't have any memory of her feeding me her blood. But she must have often, as I had enough of her blood in my system to come back as a vampire after my father shot me. In a funny way, Katherine had made me. We were almost like her children. My mind snagged. â€Å"Did Katherine ever tell you about her sire?† I asked, putting words to a horrible thought forming in my mind. â€Å"The vampire who made her?† Damon looked up at me, shocked out of his sulk. â€Å"You think†¦ ?† I nodded. Damon leaned back and knocked his head against the wall. He had been genuinely in love with Katherine. I wondered if meeting Katherine's maker made our little tryst in Mystic Falls seem like a speck in the vastness of eternity. â€Å"I suppose we should call a guard over and compel him to free us,† he said tiredly. A sound of commotion from the lobby stopped us. There were muffled thuds, like bodies hitting the floor. There was a scream. It was high-pitched and hard to tell whether it came from a woman or a man, so great was the pain. Then came the grating sound of a desk being moved, and what might have been a wooden chair being shattered against the wall. I stood. So did Damon. Damon and I glanced at each other. The pocket watch Winfield had given me ticked loudly in the sudden silence. The door to the stockade opened once again and in came a girl wearing men's trousers and black suspenders, a long blond braid over her shoulder. â€Å"Lexi!† I gasped. â€Å"I'm growing tired of bailing you boys out,† she said as she shook the key at us. â€Å"I should leave you in there overnight, teach you a lesson about making trouble,† she joked. I reached through the bars to grab her free hand. â€Å"I've never been happier to see anyone.† â€Å"I don't doubt it,† Lexi said drily, but a small smile curved the edges of her lips. Damon rolled his eyes. â€Å"We were just about to free ourselves, thank you very much.† â€Å"I don't doubt that, either. Just figured I'd speed up the escape,† she said. Her nose twitched, and her flat tone indicated she didn't entirely approve of his existence. The last time she'd seen him, he'd just gotten through killing Callie and was starting in on me. â€Å"So did you knock out the entire precinct?† Damon asked, straightening the shoulders of his jacket. Lexi undid the final lock on the door. The door sprang open and I rushed to hug her. â€Å"No, only some of them. The rest I compelled. Some of us don't like needless violence – or messes that need to be explained later,† she said into my shoulder. I released her and she motioned us toward the door. â€Å"Now let's get out of here before anyone else shows up.† â€Å"I always cover my tracks,† Damon said defensively as we rushed through the door of the containment area and into the front offices. Several policemen sat at their desks, poring over ledgers, oblivious to the two prisoners escaping and the general state of disarray. Desks had been pushed aside, among the splintery remains of what had once been a chair, and the man who had sat there was lying on the floor, a rivulet of blood leaking from his head. But his eyes were open and he appeared to be whispering some word over and over again. â€Å"Strong-willed, that one,† Lexi said. â€Å"How were you able to find us?† I asked, following her down the stairs. â€Å"A mysterious Italian count with black hair and ice-blue eyes and a flair for the dramatic sweeps into the New York social scene and very quickly marries the most eligible society girl?† she said, rolling her eyes. â€Å"They ran your picture in the social pages.† Damon at least had the grace to look sheepish. â€Å"I always cover my tracks,† she mimicked. â€Å"There are a lot of ways to live rich and powerfully as a vampire†¦ none of which involve sweeping into the New York social scene†¦Ã¢â‚¬  â€Å"†¦ and marrying the most eligible society girl. Fair enough,† Damon conceded. â€Å"At least I did it with style.† We exited the prison, and the cold evening air washed over me. The stars were just beginning to flicker in the night sky, and the gaslights cast a warm glow over the street. It was a beautiful night, the like of which Bridget, Lydia, Winfield, and Mrs. Sutherland would never enjoy again – all because of me, Damon, and Katherine. I only came to New York to escape. Escape Damon, memories of Callie, vampires, Mystic Falls, Katherine†¦ and yet it all still followed me like an onerous shadow. I knew then that I'd never escape my past, not fully. Such dark things don't fade with time – they merely reverberate through the centuries. I could only hope that Margaret was safe somewhere, away from the hell-beast that had violently murdered her entire family.

Case Brief, Tax Law Study Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 500 words

Brief, Tax Law - Case Study Example Between 1913 and 1948, each person was supposed to be taxed on their own without considering their marital status. In 1948, the Revenue Act spelt out that each married couple was supposed to file a joint return then remit double the tax that would be paid by a single individual (Fox 59). In 1969, a new class of tax payers called the two wage-earners married couple with a greater combined tax burden. This was the root cause of the "marriage penalty." ii. Does the ‘marriage penalty’ deny a person their freedom and rights in marriage? How is it related on contravenes the Fourteenth Amendment of the US Constitution which guarantees individual freedom? Analysis: The court addressed the issue of the Fourteenth Amendment and the constitutionality of the Internal Revenue Commission laws. While acknowledging that the law offers individual liberty, it was held that the "marriage penalty," in no way, violates the constitution. Besides, while accepting that this law has some adverse effects on individual taxpayers, it is an essential close in the constitution. Tax compliance is a duty and a responsibility of a patriotic citizen. IRC Section 1(D) clearly stipulates that married couple with higher incomes like the Drukers have to fall into a new category from other couples with less income. After all, the court confirmed, Revenue Act of 1948 states such married couples are supposed to file a joint tax return and double their remittances. I.R.C. Sec. 6694 (a) which forms part of the Tax Reform Act of 1976 imposes a penalty of $100 for any deliberate or intentional underestimation when filling tax returns. Such a violation constitutes neglig ence which is punishable by law. Revenue Act of 1948 states such married couples are supposed to file a joint tax return and double their remittances. I.R.C. Sec. 6694 (a) which forms part of the Tax Reform Act of 1976 imposes a penalty of $100 for any

Importance of Names in Lawrences The Book of Negroes Essay

Importance of Names in Lawrences The Book of Negroes - Essay Example Lawrence Hill through his writing techniques makes it very easy for our reading even as the heroine, Aminata Diallo is stolen from her small African village as a young girl and forced to cross the â€Å"big river†, while having to keep up with the harsh cruelty of travel through slave ship, being sold to sugarcane plantation owners in South Carolina and again being re-sold, while having her beloved husband on yet another plantation. Aminata’s husband risks his life and visits her quite often. While travelling to Nova Scotia, Aminata dreams of her child and her wishes of returning home to Africa one day. In her map, Aminata only sees Africa as composed of various wild animals including elephants and monkeys and women who are bare-breast. With her brave resistance, her skills in midwifery, reading and writing abilities and a steadfast desire to stay alive, Aminata finds the name of her homeland and travels there, finally making her last voyage to England, where she uses h er life story as a sign to empower people against slave trade. In this book, Lawrence Hill uses the title of his book â€Å"Someone Knows my name† to create a long lasting impression in the minds of his audience on the effects of slavery and how young and brave female persons resisted oppression. The story underscores a story of a female slave called Aminata and her painful journey through life and how she undergoes a series of name changing identifying circumstances just to stay afloat during the slavery days. In this book, Lawrence emphasizes that names are truly the beginning of a life’s long journey, it is what a person refers you by and it is applicable to someone’s life in very many different ways. Although names can also be common and bear significance to a certain aspect of life, the name in which Lawrence has chosen in his novel of places, people, objects and cultures bear a very practical relevance as regards to how a person perceives the other during an initial encounter. Names have a contributing factor on a pers on’s character and personality. The importance of names has been displayed in the novel by the various characters and personality characteristics that the author has provided to the characters. More importantly, Aminata comes out as a strong character in displaying the significance of names towards resistance against oppression. At the beginning of the story, the author describes how Aminata was captured into slave trade only to part of the resistance at later years joining the Black loyalists in their final journey to Nova Scotia, then a decade later she is still one of the thousands of Black loyalists in the Black-Africa movement who made their way into Sierra Leone. Initially, as a very young girl she rejects her father’s intentions to teach her in reading Koran. Later in her captivity, the spirit of determination is reinforced in her by observing Fanta’s rebellious behaviors, who acts as a yard stick for her determination and foundation for future involvemen ts in resistance. Her spirit of resistance grows stronger as Bilton also convinces her in organizing shipboard revolution. Although the revolt fails and many people are killed, Amanita and others survive this revolution by sheer force of will. At the same time, the doctor attempts to rape Amanita during Atlantic crossing, but she resists and able to discourage him by threatening him using spiritual retribution saying, â€Å"Don’t do that, or my father will return from the dead to

Total cost minimization Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 1000 words

Total cost minimization - Essay Example The new communication and information technologies today have made it possible to attain sophisticated and continuous process manufacturing. The automotive industry, for instance, has seen dramatic breakthroughs in technology displacement and reengineering. They now make over fifty million new automotives every year and are responsible for the creation of one out of every twelve jobs in the North American manufacturing industry. Experts predict that Japanese owned factories, by the end of this decade, would have the ability to make an automobile in eight hours or less (Dikbas and Scherer 297). This shorter time of production will result in fewer workers being needed for the production line. Japan’s nine automakers make over twelve million vehicles each year using less than six hundred thousand workers. Automakers in Detroit employ over two and a half million workers in the production of the same number of cars. US automakers, following Japan’s lead, have started to reen gineer their operations in the hope that they can increase their productivity, improve product share, reduce labor rolls, and increase their profit margin. GM, in 1993, announced plans for the implementation of changes in practices of production that aimed to eliminate as many as ninety thousand jobs by the late 90s (Dikbas and Scherer 298). These came on top of the quarter million jobs that they had already done away with in 1978. Other global automotive makers have also reengineered operations to eliminate thousands of employees with German automakers eliminating one in every seven jobs by 1995. The new â€Å"smart robot† generation that is armed with increased flexibility and intelligence has become a mainstay in the market, as factory owner are less likely to substitute them for laborers since they are cost-effective. Each robot replaces four jobs in the global economy and pays itself off in one year if used twenty-four hours every day. The world’s robot population was estimated at about 630,000 in 1991, and the number had grown by 3.5 times in 2008 as the machines have become more flexible, versatile, and intelligent (Meiksins et al 202). The steel industry has also had fortunes that closely mirror those of the automotive industry and have led to sweeping changes in production and organization, in the industry. The US was the world leader in production of steel in the 80s. However, this competitive edge has undergone serious erosion because of failure by companies in the US to keep in step with steel manufacturers in Japan that have made the production of steel a highly continuous and automated operation. This has led to Nippon Steel reducing its production hours to one hour from twelve days (Meiksins et al 203). Increased steel production automation has reduced the amount of labor required in North America. US Steel, the largest steel company in the US, in 1980, employed over 120,000 workers, which decreased to 20,000 in 1990 and 14,000, in 2005, even though it was producing the same output (National Academy of Engineering 10). These numbers are predicted to drop even further in the coming ten to twenty years as more advanced operations become available in the process of manufacturing in these factories. The highly automated methods of manufacturing have been used in combination with radical management hierarchy

The effect of foreshadowing in Emile Zola's Therese Raquin Essay

The effect of foreshadowing in Emile Zola's Therese Raquin - Essay Example Thesis the effect of foreshadowing helps Zola to prepare readers to plot twists and conflict of the story. The blending of past and present in Therese Raquin helps Zola to foreshadow a story conflict and appeal to emotions of readers through vivid narration and imagination. The focus throughout is on the present. It is not the expiation of crime, let alone the perpetration of it years ago, it is her marital malaise that is at issue, and the discovery of the crime serves to transform vague malaise into acute crisis. Therese Raquin, however, tackles the hindrances of freedom in the modern world more directly and more precisely. In that novel, they take the form of a hypocritical society and false values. Zola describes "She had seen Therese at work, and wished to give her to her son as a guardian angel. This marriage was a solution to the matter, foreseen and settled in her mind" (Zola 1999). This passage foreshadows further events and unveils hardship faced by the main character. Again, the past to the present is driven in by the incident when Therese and her lover drown Camille. Therese is irresponsible and frivolous, not only because the serious elements in her nature have never received encouragement, but also because she has inherited from her father a disposition towards frivolity and irresponsibility. Zola invokes childish memories as formative elements in the characters of his heroes, who, moreover, have a great deal in common with their respective mothers. Zola uses foreshadowing as the main tool to predict and predetermine the future. In the novel, the family and the little town in which they live is hardly a question on which the home-trudging multitude exercised its imaginative powers, unless it was in the cynical and rhetorical form. Zola projects the dramatic as well as the moral interest--into the future with vigor and effect. There are cynical prophecies, there are sentimental prophecies, fantastic prophecies of all kinds. Minds straying that way should remind themselves that, if the end of the novel is to be taken seriously, then clearly the greatest battle of Therese's life has already been decided and that nothing thereafter is likely to deter her from doing what she is determined to do: and that is to think out, in independence and solitude, her position in a world whose general laws she has begun to apprehend and means to fathom. Zola depicts the illness of Madame Raquin: "Paralysis was little by little gaining on Madame Ra quin, and they foresaw the day when she would be riveted to her armchair, feeble and doltish" (Zola 1999). The main benefit of this technique is that it leaves readers in suspense additional emotional tension and anxiety. In Therese Raquin, the relevant matter preceding the actual action is not so involved, but, as the title might indicate, it has a profounder significance. The character and activities of a man have to be reconstructed to account for the mentality. However skilful and, in Zola's scheme, indispensable the telescoping of a long action might be, it struck contemporaries as novel and for that reason gave rise to doubts. One of the unique symbols which foreshadow death is a portrait. In the bridal chamber hangs portrait of Camille made by Laurent. The deep meaning of this scene is underlined by the fact that beneath it the couple feared of horror at their crime, reproach one

Weekly Activity 9 Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 250 words

Weekly Activity 9 - Essay Example There are many unfortunate institutional barriers which impede the process of protection delivery to women on campus despite good policies enacted by the government like the Jeanne Clery Act. This act requires all colleges and universities to provide emotional support to victims of harassment and sexual assault. However, women still lack safety on campus because in addition to this fact that many attacks go unreported, college administrators themselves demonstrate great disbelief when complaints are delivered to them by victims. This attitude discourages students who need reassurance in times of distress (Zeisler, 2014). In order to turn around the situation of women’s safety for good at my campus, I intend to remove all those institutional barriers which impede delivery of protection to women on time. For this purpose, weekly instructional meetings will be organized after study hours on campus to make students feel more motivated and determined about reporting bad things when they happen to them. It is the silence of women which has made sexual assault a silent epidemic. These meetings will bring together women’s groups and campus safety agents in one place to put a stop to this growing epidemic. Zeisler, A. (2014, 30 Apr). College Campus Safety: What Parents and Students Should Know. HUFF POST. Retrieved from

History Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 500 words - 25

History - Essay Example w the nature of reality and truth (metaphysics); to understand how we know the things that we know (epistemology); the best way to live (ethics); the best way to govern (political philosophy); and the workings of the universe and the natural world (natural philosophy, or science). The Greeks were not the first civilization to wonder about these matters or to explore them, but they made answering these questions such a fundamental part of their cultural experience that they attained a very high level of intellectual advancement across all these areas. Their curiosity and experiments contributed to the development of Western civilization. Thornton is especially interested in the ways that the Greek civilization laid the foundation for modern day scientific and political thought. Scientifically, Greek philosophers laid the cornerstone for modern Western science. Long before the Manhattan Project and nuclear physics, the Greek philosopher Democritus argued that the world was made of tiny particles he called atoms. The Greeks were interested in what things were made of: A pencil was a pencil, but what was the pencil made of? Well, wood. And what was the wood made of? Though their answers weren’t always right, asking the questions was the most important step. And often, they were right: Anaximander theorized that the earth was round (basing this theory on the shadow it casts on the moon during an eclipse) centuries before Columbus sailed the ocean blue. The Greeks based their theories on a combination of scientific observation and rational thought, two things that form the basis of Western scientific innovation today. Most importantly, though, the Greeks gave Western science a passion for understanding the way that things work, and a willingness to make guesses and efforts in pursuit of that goal. The Western notion of government also owes much to the Greek model. Plato’s Republic outlines the model for a utopian society in which people are divided into groups

Entrepreneuria venture report Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 750 words

Entrepreneuria venture report - Essay Example On September 15, 1997 Google.com was officially registered as domain (Google, 2013). In June 1999, the venture released their first press release where it announced strategic stake sell to Kleiner Perkins and Sequoia Capital for $25 million. In 2001, Eric Schmidt became the CEO of Google while Brin and Page became the presidents of technology and products respectively. During 2002-05, Google launched many popular products like Adwords, Google News, Adsense, Google Books, Orkut, and Google Map that highlighted their accolades (Google, 2013). Larry Page and Sergey Brin are the co-founders of the venture. Their initial objective was to establish a search engine algorithm that will be able to determine the importance of individual webpages (Google, 2013). Larry started with launching ‘web crawler’ that works like search engine and explores web that originated from the home page of Stanford. Founder’s primary responsibility was to convert back-link data that the search engines gathers for a particular web page into importance measuring webpage (Google, 2013). In the year 1996, Robin Li designed a small search engine named RankDex under a subsidiary of Dow Jones. This technology worked on the same concept as Google search and it was also patented. Hence, according to my opinion as the venture grows it would be best for the company to include Li in their team which will help Google to acquire all the intellectual properties of Baidu in China that was used by Li when he founded Baidu. It is the art of mobilizing others to struggle for shared aspirations. Creativity is the inborn trait of an entrepreneur who effortlessly succeeds in his work and can work with a team by providing them proper guidance & leadership. As discussed earlier, Google’s mission is to organize the information of the world and make them universally available. These envision of imagining exciting

Penquins Research Paper Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 250 words

Penquins - Research Paper Example Penguins are of the Spheniscinae and have about 20 different types. These types all share the same features but vary by small changes in traits. When you see a bird fly in the air the look is similar to the way a penguin is able to swim in the water. The penguins are great swimmers and are graceful in the water. Their specific traits such as the look of their wings make it easy for them to swim. The wings of the penguins have a shape that looks similar to the fin of a dolphin or seal. Penguins have very distinctive mating habits. Unlike other species, the penguins have a switched role when it comes to carrying for offspring. The female and male penguins are very selective when choosing a mate and typically mate for life. Once a female penguin lays an egg, the male cares for the egg and keeps it warm. While the male is carrying for the egg the female goes out in search of food for when the egg hatches. Penguins are very unique birds and are amazing to study. Their habits and ways of life are interesting and explain a lot about their characteristic. Studying penguins shows how determined and caring there species can

Searching for ideology in spite of Media Essay Example for Free

Searching for ideology in spite of Media Essay As individuals, we constantly struggle to find a balance between personal opinion and societal compliance; between our personal value systems and what society in general regards as acceptable, or at least what it wants us to believe. However, some would agree that the influence that media exerts on our psyche can upset such a balance. Every individual aims to be unique and original with their reasoning, but the odds are stacked against them as streams of media flow with such a prominent impact on societal ideology. The effect of the media is significant and far-reaching. Everywhere, the media encroaches upon our ideologies and everything that we hold sacred and changes it in ways that we are often unaware of. Holding on to our personal ideologies in the face of media is swimming upstream against resistance and the irresistible currents of change. Indeed the media has been a powerful force in influencing people’s perceptions, and by extension, their actions as well. Business, politicians, and showbiz personalities pay huge sums of money to media firms in order to create an image or change an existing one. Politics in particular, has been making use of the media to generate public support for certain policies. As an economic force the media has been used by Western nations to trespass into Third World Cultures and impose their own Western views and in effect promote Western goods. The westernization of these countries has led to the destruction of the many elements of native cultures. Similarly, the media infringes upon our system of values and we are never the same. With the greater outpouring of media coming from the United States, advertisers, writers and even politicians of other countries are forced to swim upstream against certain influences from a society that preaches to a larger audience than it can actually support. A trend is emerging in the presentation of media products which Sony has described as ‘global localization’: the structuring of media products designed for certain cultural consumption or presentation, which are assembled without particular concerns for national cultural heritage or tradition (Thussu 21). Of course it must be said that media per se is not the culprit. It is a neutral instrument that can be used both for good and bad ends. The capacity of media to effect positive or negative effects on an individual or a given society depends on the people using the media as a very powerful tool to advance their own, often selfish causes. As such, this paper intends to look at how the media is being used as a tool primarily to promote political and economic agendas. Ideas on Ideology Ideologies refer to a set of beliefs of ways of living that structures the way we see things and act upon accordingly. These ideologies often act below the surface and are the driving force that determines our actions of a daily basis. Ideologies are products of the culture that people were exposed to. In the realm of the social sciences, ideology is perhaps one of the most difficult to define because of its highly complex nature (Bailey 4). Regardless of the difficulties of the concept, we all have some functional grasp of our own ideologies, and it serves as the framework with which we perceive the world at large and by which we base our decisions and value judgments. In terms of society, the word ideology basically makes the connection between ideas and the kind of society that we have (Bailey 23). This implies that a society is the realization of the collective thoughts or ideas of a people, and as such, can also be changed by the same token. For sociologist, ideology refers to ideas that are actually forwarded and manifested for the very purpose of effecting change. These ideologies are ideas or beliefs applied in the public realm; abstract made real. As such, every political entity has a set of ideologies that form the basis of its platform and policies. This paper uses the term ideology in a more general sense; ideology as the set of beliefs and values that buttress an individual and how such ideologies change in the face of media manipulation. As such, these ideologies are the main targets of media as they endeavor to convince people to change their beliefs and value systems.

Corporate Governance Score and Firm Performance

Corporate Governance Score and Firm Performance Limited liability company structure is the most preferred structure for a large business. In this structure, a large number of investors provide the risk capital. They are called shareholders, the deemed owners of the company. They delegate the power to manage the company to board of directors. The board delegates the same to managers while retaining its role to monitor and control the executive management. Shareholders are viewed as the principal and the manager as their agents and this relationship is described as principal-agent relationship. The shareholders, of a widely held firm, practically do not have any control on the managers. They are only informed of the financial results on a periodical basis while the managers controls the firms assets. This structure provides an opportunity to the managers to expropriate shareholders wealth and misappropriate the funds by way of transfer of money as loans to his own companies, or sale of the company assets to themselves at a lesser pr ice or pay themselves more perks. The divergence of interest between the owners and the managers, due to the separation of ownership from control, results in the agency costs. It is not just separation of ownership and control that gives rise to the agency problem between shareholders and managers; but also the atomistic or diffused nature of corporate ownership, which is characterized by a large number of small shareholders. In such ownership structure, there is no incentive for any one owner to monitor corporate management, because the individual owner would bear the entire monitoring costs, yet all shareholders would enjoy the benefits. Thus, both the magnitude and nature of agency problems are directly related to ownership structures. The fundamental theoretical basis of corporate governance is agency costs. The core of corporate governance is designing and putting in place disclosures, monitoring, oversight and corrective systems that can align the objectives of the shareholders and managers as closely as possible and hence, minimize agency costs. It deals with conducting the affairs of a company such that there is fairness to all stakeholders and that its actions benefit the greatest number of stakeholders. There are two kinds of mechanisms to overcome the agency problem and hence, improve corporate governance viz., the internal control mechanisms and the external control mechanisms. Internal control mechanisms are internal to the functioning of a company and broadly consist of the board composition, the board size, the leadership structure and the managerial compensation. External control mechanisms are the mechanisms that are external to the functioning of the firm over which the firm has no control. An increasingly important external control mechanism affecting governance worldwide is the emergence of institutional investors as equity owners. Although the role that the institutional investors can play in the corporate governance system of a company is a controversial question and a subject of continuing debate. While some believe that the institutional investors must interfere in the corporate governance system of a company, others believe that these investors have other investment objectives to follow. The group of observers who believe that institutional investors need not play a role in the corporate governance system of a company, argue that the investment objectives and the compensation system in the institutional investing companies often discourage their active participation in the corporate governance system of the companies. Institutional investors are answerable to their investors the way the companies (in which they have invested) are answerable to their shareholders. And the shareholders do invest their funds with the institutional investors expecting higher returns. The primary responsibility of the instituti onal investors is therefore to invest the money of the investors in companies, which are expected to generate the maximum possible return rather than in companies with good corporate governance records. While the other group strongly believes that if the corporate governance system in the companies has to succeed then the institutional investors must play an active role in the entire process. By virtue of their large stockholdings, they have the opportunity, resources, and ability to monitor, discipline and influence managers, which can force them to focus more on corporate performance and less on self-serving behavior. Most of the reports on corporate governance have also emphasized the role that the institutional investors have to play in the entire system. Given the increasing presence of institutional investors in financial markets, it is not surprising that they have become more active in their role as shareholders. Activism by institutional investors has been both private and public, with the public activism being most visible in many countries. The role of institutional investors is visualized in two perspectives, the corporate governance and the firm performance. 7.2 Objectives of Study In light of the above discussion, the present study attempts to achieve the following objectives: To construct the corporate governance score To establish relationship between institutional holdings and corporate  governance score To establish relationship between institutional holdings and firm performance To establish relationship between corporate governance score and  firm performance In order to achieve the objectives stated above, the present study conceptualized the following null hypotheses for the validation of positive relationship between institutional holdings, corporate governance and firm performance 7.3 Hypotheses: H01: Institutional/its components Holdings and Corporate Governance score are  very closely related in a manner as to depict a positive relationship between  the two H02: Corporate Governance Score and Institutional/its components Holdings are  also very closely related in a manner as to depict positive relationship  between the two H03: Institutional/its components Holdings and various measures of firm  performance are very closely related in a manner as to depict  positive relationship between the two H04: Corporate Governance Score and various measures of firm performance  are very closely related in a manner as to depict positive relationship between  the two 7.4 The Sample Design and Data: To achieve the above objectives, a sample of 200 companies has been taken. The present study is based on the secondary data. It covers a period of five financial years from 1st April 2004 to 31st March 2008. Institutional holdings are further segregated into three constituents. The mutual funds being the first one. The second constituent includes various public and private sector banks, all the developmental financial institutions (like IFCI, ICICI, IDBI, SFC) and insurance companies like the LIC, GIC, and their subsidiaries. The last constituent comprise of foreign institutional investors. Data has been collected on the institutional holdings in total as well as on different constituents of institutional holdings from nseindia.com. The secondary data regarding annual reports to construct the corporate governance score have been collected from respective company websites and sebiedifar.com. . The firm performance measures have been divided into two categories, one being the accountin g measures while others are based on market returns. The accounting return measures include (%) return on networth, (%) return on capital employed, Profit After Tax, (%) Return on Assets, Net Profit Margin and Earning Per Share. Whereas, market return based measures include Tobins Q, (%) Risk Adjusted Excess Return and (%) Dividend Yield. Data for the study period on financial performance measures have been collected from Prowess Database. 7.5 Statistical Tools: Simple linear regression analysis has been used as a statistical tool to investigate the relationship between different variables. An attempt has been made to ascertain the causal effect of one variable upon another. Data has been assembled on the variables of interest and employed regression to estimate the quantitative effect of the causal variables upon the variable that they influence. The study also typically assesses the statistical significance at 5 percent level of the estimated relationships, that is, the degree of confidence that the true relationship is close to the estimated relationship. Section A 7.6 Construction of Corporate Governance Score Review of Literature Some researchers have used board characteristics as an effective measure of corporate governance as Hermalin and Weisbach (1998, 2003) have used board independence, Bhagat, Carey and Elson (1999) have used stock ownership of board members and Brickley, Coles and Jarrell (1997) have used the occupation of Chairman and CEO positions by the same or two different individuals. Whereas, Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) have constructed a governance measure comprising of an equally weighted index of 24 corporate governance provisions compiled by the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC), such as, poison pills, golden parachutes, classified boards, cumulative voting, and supermajority rules to approve mergers. Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell (BCF, 2004) created an entrenchment index comprising of six provisions – four provisions that limit Shareholder rights and two that make potential hostile takeovers more difficult. While the above noted studies use IRRC data, Brown and Caylor (2004) used Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) data to create their governance index. This index considered 51corporate governance features encompassing eight corporate governance categories: audit, board of directors, charter/bylaws, director education, executive and director compensation, ownership, progressive practices, and state of incorporation. In the present study, Corporate Governance Score has been developed on the basis of key characteristics of Standard and Poors Transparency and Disclosure Benchmark. Standard and Poors provides a range of corporate governance analyses and services, the crux of which is the Corporate Governance Score. Corporate Governance Scores are based on an assessment of the qualitative aspects of corporate governance practices of a company. Information has been collected on the attributes from the latest available annual reports of sample companies. The methodology, with 98 questions in three categories and 12 sub-categories, is designed to balance the conflicting requirements of the range of issues analyzed and the tractability of the analysis. Transparency and Disclosure is evaluated by searching company annual reports for the 98  possible attributes broadly divided into the following three broad categories: Ownership structure and investor rights (28 attributes) Financial transparency and information disclosure (35 attributes) Board and management structure and process (35 attributes) Resume Various researchers have considered alternate measures of corporate governance. Some of them have used single measure, while others have used the multiple measures in the form of indices. In the present study, Corporate Governance Score has been developed on the basis of key characteristics of Standard and Poors Transparency and Disclosure Benchmark because two broad instruments that reduce agency costs and hence improve corporate governance are financial and non-financial disclosures and independent oversight of management. Improving the quality of financial and non-financial disclosures not only ensures corporate transparency among a wide group of investors, analysts and the informed intelligentsia, but also persuades companies to minimize value-destroying deviant behavior. This is precisely why law insists that companies prepare their audited annual accounts, and that these be provided to all shareholders is deposited with the Registrar of Companies. This is also why a good deal o f effort in global corporate governance reform has been directed to improve the quality and frequency of disclosures. Section B Relationship between Institutional Holdings and Corporate Governance: Review of Literature Coombes and Watson (2000) on the basis of a survey of more than 200 institutional investors with investments across the world showed that governance is a significant factor in their investment decision. McCahery, Sautner and Starks (2009) have relied on the survey data to investigate governance preference of 118 institutional investors in U.S. and Netherlands. The study found that the majority of institutions that responded to the survey take into account firm governance in portfolio weighting decisions and are willing to engage in activities that can improve the governance of their portfolio firms. Chung, Firth, and Kim (2002) hypothesized that there will be less opportunistic earnings management in firms with more institutional investor ownership because the institutions will either put pressure on the firms to adopt better accounting policies. Hartzell and Starks (2003) provided empirical evidence suggesting institutional investors serve a monitoring role with regard to executive compensation contracts. One implication of these results, consistent with the theoretical literature regarding the role of the large shareholder, is that institutions have greater influence when they have larger proportional stakes in firms. . Denis and Denis (1994) found no evidence to suggest that there is any relationship between institutional holdings and corporate governance. They stated that if companies that create shareholders wealth are the ones with poor corporate governance practices, and then one really cannot blame the institutional investors for having invested in such companies. For, after all, a fund manager will be evaluated on the basis of stock returns he creates for the unit holders and not on the basis of the corporate governance records of the company he invests the money in. If however, one finds that companies with poor corporate governance practices are the ones, which have consistently destroyed shareholders wealth, then the contention that the institutional investors need not look at corporate governance records cannot be justified. David and Kochhar (1996) provided empirical evidence regarding impact of institutional investors on firm behaviour and performance is mixed and that no definite concl usions can be drawn. They argued that various institutional obstacles, such as barriers stemming from business relationships, the regulatory environment and information processing limitations, might prevent institutional investors from effectively exercising their corporate governance function. Almazan, Hartzell and Starks (2003) provided evidence both theoretical and empirical that the monitoring influence of institutional investors on executive compensation can depend on the current or prospective business relation between the institution and the corporation. They concluded that the monitoring influence of institutions is associated more with potentially active institutions (investment companies and pension fund managers who would be less sensitive to pressure from corporate management due to lack of potential business relations) than with potentially passive institutions (banks and insurance companies who would be more pressure-sensitive). Davis and Kim (2006) found that mutual funds with conflicts of interest (based on management of pension assets) more often vote with management in general. On the other hand, mutual funds have more incentive and power to oppose management in firms in which they have a larger stake. Marsh (1997) has argued that short-term performance measurement does work against the active monitoring by institutional investors. The performance of fund managers is evaluated over a shorter time period. Hence, they act under tremendous pressure to beat some index. So, when they find a case of bad governance, they find it economical to sell the stock rather than interfere in the functioning of the company and incur monitoring costs. Ashraf and Jayaman (2007) examined mutual funds trading behavior after the release of voting records. The study found that funds that support shareholder proposals reduce holdings after the release of voting records. Since the time of releasing voting records could be very far from the shareholder meeting date, mutual funds trading behavior after the release of voting records may be unrelated to the votes cast in the meeting. Aggarwal, Klapper and Wysocki (2003) found that U.S. mutual funds tend to invest greater amounts in countries with stronger share holder rights and legal frameworks (controlling for the countrys economic development). In addition, within the countries, the mutual funds also discriminate on the basis of governance in that they allocate more of their assets to firms with better corporate governance structures. Payne, Millar, and Glezen (1996) focussed on banks as one type of institutional investor that would be expected to have business relations with the firms in which they invest. They examined interlocking directorships and income-related relationships, and noticed that when such relations exist; banks tend to vote in favor of management anti-takeover amendment proposals. When such relations dont exist, banks tend to vote against the management proposals. Brickley, Lease and Smith (1988) found evidence supporting the hypothesis that firms with greater holdings by pressure-sensitive shareholders (banks and insurance companies) have more proxy votes cast in favor of managements recommendations. Moreover, firms with greater holdings by pressure-insensitive shareholders (pension funds and mutual funds) have more proxy votes against managements recommendations. The authors differentiated between the different types of institutional investors, noting the difference between pressure-sensitive and pressure-insensitive institutional shareholders and arguing that pressure-sensitive institutions are more likely to go along with management decisions. Dahlquist et al. (2003) analyzed foreign ownership and firm characteristics for the Swedish market. The study found that foreigners have greater presence in large firms, firms paying low dividends and in firms with large cash holdings. Haw, Hu, Hwang and Wu (2004) found that firm level factors cause information asymmetry problems to FII. It found evidence that US investment is lower in firms where managers do not have effective control. Foreign investment in firms that appear to engage in more earnings management is lower in countries with poor information framework. Choe, Kho, Stulz (2005) found that US investors do indeed hold fewer shares in firms with ownership structures that are more conducive to expropriation by controlling insiders. In companies where insiders are dominating information access and availability to the shareholders will be limited. With less information, foreign investors face an adverse selection problem. So they under invest in such stocks. Leuz, Lins, and Wa rnock (2008) found that foreign institutional investors prefer to invest in firms with better governance practices. In the present study, the analysis has been conducted in three perspectives: Dynamics of institutional holdings and its composition (2) Relationship between Institutional Holdings (explanatory variable) and the Corporate Governance Score (dependent variable) (3) Relationship between the Corporate Governance Score (explanatory variable) and Institutional Holdings (dependent variable) The major findings of the present study on the above aspects are summarized as under: The results outputs of the first segment depict that the institutional investors have increased their proportional holdings in the companies over the years. The number of sampled companies with higher institutional holdings has increased where as the number of companies with lower proportions of institutional holdings has decreased over the study period. Hence, institutional holdings have shown an increasing trend of investment in the sampled companies over the study period. As far as the dynamics of components of institutional investors is concerned, no specific trend is observed in investments of mutual funds. On the other hand Banks, Financial Institutions and Insurance Companies have shown declining trends of investments over the same period. Where as, foreign institutional investors have shown the increasing trends of investments in line with institutional holdings. The results outputs pertaining to the analysis of relationship between institutional holdings and corporate governance state that the larger proportions of institutional holdings have higher corporate governance scores in sampled companies and the smaller proportions of institutional holdings have lower governance scores in the sampled companies over the study period. Thus, very strong and positive relationship is established between institutional holdings and corporate governance. Hence, H01 is accepted. The results outputs of the section analyzing the relationship between corporate governance score and institutional holdings describe that the companies with higher governance scores have larger proportions of investments from institutional investors than the companies with lower governance scores. Therefore, very strong and positive relationship also exists between corporate governance score and institutional holdings. Hence, H02 is accepted. The inference can be drawn that institut ional holdings pre-empts good corporate governance still at other times, good corporate governance endues institutional investment in the firm. The results outputs pertaining to the analysis of relationship between mutual funds and corporate governance reveal out that smaller proportions of mutual funds holdings have higher governance score in the sampled companies and larger proportions of mutual funds holdings have lower governance scores in the sampled companies over the study period. Therefore, weak relationship exists between mutual funds holdings and corporate governance score. Hence, H01 is rejected. Alternatively, the results outputs pertaining to the analysis of relationship between corporate governance and components of institutional holdings reveal out that the companies with lower governance scores have larger proportions of mutual funds holdings to the companies with higher governance scores over the study period. Hence, weak relationship also exists between corporate governance score and mutual funds holdings. Hence, H02 is rejected. It can be inferred from the above outcomes that mutual funds companies do not observe good governance practices in companies and simultaneously, good governed companies also do not attract higher mutual funds investments. The results outputs as to the relationship between Banks, FIs and ICs and corporate governance depict that larger proportions of Banks, Financial Institutions and Insurance Companies holdings have higher governance score and smaller proportions of holdings have lower governance score in the sampled companies over the study period. Therefore, very strong and positive relationship is established between Banks, Financial Institutions and Insurance Companies holdings and corporate governance score. Hence, H01 is accepted. Similarly, the sampled companies with higher governance scores have larger proportions of Banks, FIs and ICs holdings to the companies with lower governance scores. Thus, very strong and positive relationship also exists between corporate governance score and Banks, FIs and ICs holdings. Hence, H02 is also accepted. The inference can be drawn on the basis of above results that Banks, FIs and ICs consider governance practices in companies while taking investment decision and alternatively, good governed companies also attract these investments. The results outputs pertaining to the relationship between FII holdings and corporate governance reveal out that the companies in which FIIs have larger proportions of holdings have higher governance score to the companies in which FIIs have smaller proportions of holdings. Therefore, very strong and positive relationship is observed between FII holdings and corporate governance score. Hence, H01 is accepted. Likewise, the sampled companies with higher governance scores have also larger proportions of Foreign Institutional Investors holdings. Thus, very strong and positive relationship also exists between corporate governance score and FII holdings. Hence, H02 is accepted. It can be inferred on the basis of above result that foreign institutional investors prefer to invest in firms with better governance practices and their investment do improve the governance practices in the companies. Resume The theoretical and empirical literature provides mixed evidence as to the relationship between institutional holdings and corporate governance. Some of the studies put forth the evidence that corporate governance is the significant factor for institutional investment decision and their significant investment improve the governance practices in companies, while the other studies state otherwise. Where as the research findings of the present study further validate, support and enrich the literature on positive association between institutional holdings and corporate governance. Likewise, the studies provide inconclusive evidence as to the relationship between mutual funds holdings and corporate governance. But the findings of present study state that neither the mutual funds care about the governance practices of companies or their presence improve them. Similarly, the empirical literature provides indeterminate evidence on the relationship between Banks, FIs and ICs and corporate governance. But the findings of present study observe very strong and positive relationship between the two. The empirical studies observe consistent results as to foreign institutional investors invest in better-governed companies but lacks evidence that their significant presence result in better governance. The findings of present study indicate that FIIs do not care for the corporate governance only, rather their higher stake ensure better governance too. Section C 7.8 Relationship between Institutional Holdings and Firm Performance: Review of Literature Pound (1988) explored the influence of institutional ownerships on firm performance and proposed three hypotheses on the relation between institutional shareholders and firm performance: efficient-monitoring hypothesis, conflict-of-interest hypothesis, and strategic-alignment hypothesis. The efficient-monitoring hypothesis says that institutional investors have greater expertise and can monitor management at lower cost than the small atomistic shareholders. Consequently, this argument predicts a positive relationship between institutional shareholding and firm performance. Holderness and Sheehan (1988) found that for a sample of 114 US firms controlled by a majority shareholder with more than 50% of shares, both Tobins Q and accounting profits are significantly lower for firms with individual majority owners than for firms with corporate majority owners. McConnell and Servaes (1990) found a strong positive relationship between the value of the firm and the fraction of shares held by institutional investors. They found that performance increases significantly with institutional ownership. Majumdar and Nagarajan (1994) found that levels of institutional investment are positively related to the current performance levels of firms. However, a less-stronger, though positive, effect is established between changes in performance levels and changes in institutional ownership. The results are based on a study investigating U.S. institutional investors investment strategy. Han and Suk (1998) found (for a sample of US firms) that stock returns are positively related to ownership by institutional investors, thus implying that these corporate owners are actively involved in the monitoring of incumbent management. Douma, Rejie and Kabir (2006) investigated the impact of foreign institutional investment on the performance of emerging market firms and found that there is positive effect of foreign ownership on firm performance. They also found impact of foreign investment on the business group affiliation of firms. Investor protection is poor in case of firms with controlling shareh olders who have ability to expropriate assets. The block shareholders affect the value of the firm and influence the private benefits they receive from the firm. Companies with such shareholders find it expensive to raise external funds. Studies examining the relationship between institutional holdings and firm performance in different countries (mainly OECD countries) have produced mixed results. Chaganti and Damanpour (1991) and Lowenstein (1991) find little evidence that institutional ownership is correlated with firm performance. Seifert, Gonenc and Wright (2005) study does not find a consistent relationship across countries. They conclude that their inconsistent results may reflect the fact that the influence of institutional investors on firm performance is location specific. The above studies generally consider institutional investors as a monolithic group. However, Shleifer and Vishnys (1986) as well as Pounds (1988) theorizations and later empirical examinations by McConnell and Servaes (1990) suggest that shareholders are differentiable and pursue different agendas. Jensen and Merkling (1976) also show that equity ownerships by different groups have different effects on the firm performance. Agrawal and Kno eber (1996), Karpoff et al. (1996), Duggal and Miller (1999) and Faccio and Lasfer (2000) find no such significant relation between institutional holdings and firm performance. In the present study, the analysis has been conducted in two perspectives: Institutional Holdings and Firm performance (b) Constituents of institutional holdings and Firm performance The major findings of the present study on the above aspects are summarized as under: The results outputs of the first segment indicate that there is no conclusive evidence as to larger proportions of institutional holdings in sampled companies have higher average return on networth or average net profit margin and smaller proportions of institutional holdings in sampled companies have lower average return on networth or average net profit margin over the study period. To the contrary, strong and positive relationship is observed between institutional holdings and return on capital employed as well as institutional holdings and earning per share. As the average return on capital employed and average earning per share are higher in the sampled companies with higher proportions of institutional holdings and lower in the sampled companies with lower proportions of institutional holdings over the study period. Therefore, it is stated that institutional holdings and two accounting returns (return on capital employed and earning per share) are significantly correlated where as institutional holdings and other two accounting returns (return on networth and net profit margin) are not related. Hence, there is no clear evidence that institutional holdings and accounting returns are related. Likewise, strong and positive relationship is observed between institutional holdings and Tobins q. But on the other hand, weak relationship is observed between institutional holdings and risk adjusted excess return. Therefore, institutional holdings and one market-based return are significantly correlated while the institutional holdings and another market-based return are not. Thus, the findings depict contradictory results as to the relationship between institutional holdings and market Corporate Governance Score and Firm Performance Corporate Governance Score and Firm Performance Limited liability company structure is the most preferred structure for a large business. In this structure, a large number of investors provide the risk capital. They are called shareholders, the deemed owners of the company. They delegate the power to manage the company to board of directors. The board delegates the same to managers while retaining its role to monitor and control the executive management. Shareholders are viewed as the principal and the manager as their agents and this relationship is described as principal-agent relationship. The shareholders, of a widely held firm, practically do not have any control on the managers. They are only informed of the financial results on a periodical basis while the managers controls the firms assets. This structure provides an opportunity to the managers to expropriate shareholders wealth and misappropriate the funds by way of transfer of money as loans to his own companies, or sale of the company assets to themselves at a lesser pr ice or pay themselves more perks. The divergence of interest between the owners and the managers, due to the separation of ownership from control, results in the agency costs. It is not just separation of ownership and control that gives rise to the agency problem between shareholders and managers; but also the atomistic or diffused nature of corporate ownership, which is characterized by a large number of small shareholders. In such ownership structure, there is no incentive for any one owner to monitor corporate management, because the individual owner would bear the entire monitoring costs, yet all shareholders would enjoy the benefits. Thus, both the magnitude and nature of agency problems are directly related to ownership structures. The fundamental theoretical basis of corporate governance is agency costs. The core of corporate governance is designing and putting in place disclosures, monitoring, oversight and corrective systems that can align the objectives of the shareholders and managers as closely as possible and hence, minimize agency costs. It deals with conducting the affairs of a company such that there is fairness to all stakeholders and that its actions benefit the greatest number of stakeholders. There are two kinds of mechanisms to overcome the agency problem and hence, improve corporate governance viz., the internal control mechanisms and the external control mechanisms. Internal control mechanisms are internal to the functioning of a company and broadly consist of the board composition, the board size, the leadership structure and the managerial compensation. External control mechanisms are the mechanisms that are external to the functioning of the firm over which the firm has no control. An increasingly important external control mechanism affecting governance worldwide is the emergence of institutional investors as equity owners. Although the role that the institutional investors can play in the corporate governance system of a company is a controversial question and a subject of continuing debate. While some believe that the institutional investors must interfere in the corporate governance system of a company, others believe that these investors have other investment objectives to follow. The group of observers who believe that institutional investors need not play a role in the corporate governance system of a company, argue that the investment objectives and the compensation system in the institutional investing companies often discourage their active participation in the corporate governance system of the companies. Institutional investors are answerable to their investors the way the companies (in which they have invested) are answerable to their shareholders. And the shareholders do invest their funds with the institutional investors expecting higher returns. The primary responsibility of the instituti onal investors is therefore to invest the money of the investors in companies, which are expected to generate the maximum possible return rather than in companies with good corporate governance records. While the other group strongly believes that if the corporate governance system in the companies has to succeed then the institutional investors must play an active role in the entire process. By virtue of their large stockholdings, they have the opportunity, resources, and ability to monitor, discipline and influence managers, which can force them to focus more on corporate performance and less on self-serving behavior. Most of the reports on corporate governance have also emphasized the role that the institutional investors have to play in the entire system. Given the increasing presence of institutional investors in financial markets, it is not surprising that they have become more active in their role as shareholders. Activism by institutional investors has been both private and public, with the public activism being most visible in many countries. The role of institutional investors is visualized in two perspectives, the corporate governance and the firm performance. 7.2 Objectives of Study In light of the above discussion, the present study attempts to achieve the following objectives: To construct the corporate governance score To establish relationship between institutional holdings and corporate  governance score To establish relationship between institutional holdings and firm performance To establish relationship between corporate governance score and  firm performance In order to achieve the objectives stated above, the present study conceptualized the following null hypotheses for the validation of positive relationship between institutional holdings, corporate governance and firm performance 7.3 Hypotheses: H01: Institutional/its components Holdings and Corporate Governance score are  very closely related in a manner as to depict a positive relationship between  the two H02: Corporate Governance Score and Institutional/its components Holdings are  also very closely related in a manner as to depict positive relationship  between the two H03: Institutional/its components Holdings and various measures of firm  performance are very closely related in a manner as to depict  positive relationship between the two H04: Corporate Governance Score and various measures of firm performance  are very closely related in a manner as to depict positive relationship between  the two 7.4 The Sample Design and Data: To achieve the above objectives, a sample of 200 companies has been taken. The present study is based on the secondary data. It covers a period of five financial years from 1st April 2004 to 31st March 2008. Institutional holdings are further segregated into three constituents. The mutual funds being the first one. The second constituent includes various public and private sector banks, all the developmental financial institutions (like IFCI, ICICI, IDBI, SFC) and insurance companies like the LIC, GIC, and their subsidiaries. The last constituent comprise of foreign institutional investors. Data has been collected on the institutional holdings in total as well as on different constituents of institutional holdings from nseindia.com. The secondary data regarding annual reports to construct the corporate governance score have been collected from respective company websites and sebiedifar.com. . The firm performance measures have been divided into two categories, one being the accountin g measures while others are based on market returns. The accounting return measures include (%) return on networth, (%) return on capital employed, Profit After Tax, (%) Return on Assets, Net Profit Margin and Earning Per Share. Whereas, market return based measures include Tobins Q, (%) Risk Adjusted Excess Return and (%) Dividend Yield. Data for the study period on financial performance measures have been collected from Prowess Database. 7.5 Statistical Tools: Simple linear regression analysis has been used as a statistical tool to investigate the relationship between different variables. An attempt has been made to ascertain the causal effect of one variable upon another. Data has been assembled on the variables of interest and employed regression to estimate the quantitative effect of the causal variables upon the variable that they influence. The study also typically assesses the statistical significance at 5 percent level of the estimated relationships, that is, the degree of confidence that the true relationship is close to the estimated relationship. Section A 7.6 Construction of Corporate Governance Score Review of Literature Some researchers have used board characteristics as an effective measure of corporate governance as Hermalin and Weisbach (1998, 2003) have used board independence, Bhagat, Carey and Elson (1999) have used stock ownership of board members and Brickley, Coles and Jarrell (1997) have used the occupation of Chairman and CEO positions by the same or two different individuals. Whereas, Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) have constructed a governance measure comprising of an equally weighted index of 24 corporate governance provisions compiled by the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC), such as, poison pills, golden parachutes, classified boards, cumulative voting, and supermajority rules to approve mergers. Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell (BCF, 2004) created an entrenchment index comprising of six provisions – four provisions that limit Shareholder rights and two that make potential hostile takeovers more difficult. While the above noted studies use IRRC data, Brown and Caylor (2004) used Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) data to create their governance index. This index considered 51corporate governance features encompassing eight corporate governance categories: audit, board of directors, charter/bylaws, director education, executive and director compensation, ownership, progressive practices, and state of incorporation. In the present study, Corporate Governance Score has been developed on the basis of key characteristics of Standard and Poors Transparency and Disclosure Benchmark. Standard and Poors provides a range of corporate governance analyses and services, the crux of which is the Corporate Governance Score. Corporate Governance Scores are based on an assessment of the qualitative aspects of corporate governance practices of a company. Information has been collected on the attributes from the latest available annual reports of sample companies. The methodology, with 98 questions in three categories and 12 sub-categories, is designed to balance the conflicting requirements of the range of issues analyzed and the tractability of the analysis. Transparency and Disclosure is evaluated by searching company annual reports for the 98  possible attributes broadly divided into the following three broad categories: Ownership structure and investor rights (28 attributes) Financial transparency and information disclosure (35 attributes) Board and management structure and process (35 attributes) Resume Various researchers have considered alternate measures of corporate governance. Some of them have used single measure, while others have used the multiple measures in the form of indices. In the present study, Corporate Governance Score has been developed on the basis of key characteristics of Standard and Poors Transparency and Disclosure Benchmark because two broad instruments that reduce agency costs and hence improve corporate governance are financial and non-financial disclosures and independent oversight of management. Improving the quality of financial and non-financial disclosures not only ensures corporate transparency among a wide group of investors, analysts and the informed intelligentsia, but also persuades companies to minimize value-destroying deviant behavior. This is precisely why law insists that companies prepare their audited annual accounts, and that these be provided to all shareholders is deposited with the Registrar of Companies. This is also why a good deal o f effort in global corporate governance reform has been directed to improve the quality and frequency of disclosures. Section B Relationship between Institutional Holdings and Corporate Governance: Review of Literature Coombes and Watson (2000) on the basis of a survey of more than 200 institutional investors with investments across the world showed that governance is a significant factor in their investment decision. McCahery, Sautner and Starks (2009) have relied on the survey data to investigate governance preference of 118 institutional investors in U.S. and Netherlands. The study found that the majority of institutions that responded to the survey take into account firm governance in portfolio weighting decisions and are willing to engage in activities that can improve the governance of their portfolio firms. Chung, Firth, and Kim (2002) hypothesized that there will be less opportunistic earnings management in firms with more institutional investor ownership because the institutions will either put pressure on the firms to adopt better accounting policies. Hartzell and Starks (2003) provided empirical evidence suggesting institutional investors serve a monitoring role with regard to executive compensation contracts. One implication of these results, consistent with the theoretical literature regarding the role of the large shareholder, is that institutions have greater influence when they have larger proportional stakes in firms. . Denis and Denis (1994) found no evidence to suggest that there is any relationship between institutional holdings and corporate governance. They stated that if companies that create shareholders wealth are the ones with poor corporate governance practices, and then one really cannot blame the institutional investors for having invested in such companies. For, after all, a fund manager will be evaluated on the basis of stock returns he creates for the unit holders and not on the basis of the corporate governance records of the company he invests the money in. If however, one finds that companies with poor corporate governance practices are the ones, which have consistently destroyed shareholders wealth, then the contention that the institutional investors need not look at corporate governance records cannot be justified. David and Kochhar (1996) provided empirical evidence regarding impact of institutional investors on firm behaviour and performance is mixed and that no definite concl usions can be drawn. They argued that various institutional obstacles, such as barriers stemming from business relationships, the regulatory environment and information processing limitations, might prevent institutional investors from effectively exercising their corporate governance function. Almazan, Hartzell and Starks (2003) provided evidence both theoretical and empirical that the monitoring influence of institutional investors on executive compensation can depend on the current or prospective business relation between the institution and the corporation. They concluded that the monitoring influence of institutions is associated more with potentially active institutions (investment companies and pension fund managers who would be less sensitive to pressure from corporate management due to lack of potential business relations) than with potentially passive institutions (banks and insurance companies who would be more pressure-sensitive). Davis and Kim (2006) found that mutual funds with conflicts of interest (based on management of pension assets) more often vote with management in general. On the other hand, mutual funds have more incentive and power to oppose management in firms in which they have a larger stake. Marsh (1997) has argued that short-term performance measurement does work against the active monitoring by institutional investors. The performance of fund managers is evaluated over a shorter time period. Hence, they act under tremendous pressure to beat some index. So, when they find a case of bad governance, they find it economical to sell the stock rather than interfere in the functioning of the company and incur monitoring costs. Ashraf and Jayaman (2007) examined mutual funds trading behavior after the release of voting records. The study found that funds that support shareholder proposals reduce holdings after the release of voting records. Since the time of releasing voting records could be very far from the shareholder meeting date, mutual funds trading behavior after the release of voting records may be unrelated to the votes cast in the meeting. Aggarwal, Klapper and Wysocki (2003) found that U.S. mutual funds tend to invest greater amounts in countries with stronger share holder rights and legal frameworks (controlling for the countrys economic development). In addition, within the countries, the mutual funds also discriminate on the basis of governance in that they allocate more of their assets to firms with better corporate governance structures. Payne, Millar, and Glezen (1996) focussed on banks as one type of institutional investor that would be expected to have business relations with the firms in which they invest. They examined interlocking directorships and income-related relationships, and noticed that when such relations exist; banks tend to vote in favor of management anti-takeover amendment proposals. When such relations dont exist, banks tend to vote against the management proposals. Brickley, Lease and Smith (1988) found evidence supporting the hypothesis that firms with greater holdings by pressure-sensitive shareholders (banks and insurance companies) have more proxy votes cast in favor of managements recommendations. Moreover, firms with greater holdings by pressure-insensitive shareholders (pension funds and mutual funds) have more proxy votes against managements recommendations. The authors differentiated between the different types of institutional investors, noting the difference between pressure-sensitive and pressure-insensitive institutional shareholders and arguing that pressure-sensitive institutions are more likely to go along with management decisions. Dahlquist et al. (2003) analyzed foreign ownership and firm characteristics for the Swedish market. The study found that foreigners have greater presence in large firms, firms paying low dividends and in firms with large cash holdings. Haw, Hu, Hwang and Wu (2004) found that firm level factors cause information asymmetry problems to FII. It found evidence that US investment is lower in firms where managers do not have effective control. Foreign investment in firms that appear to engage in more earnings management is lower in countries with poor information framework. Choe, Kho, Stulz (2005) found that US investors do indeed hold fewer shares in firms with ownership structures that are more conducive to expropriation by controlling insiders. In companies where insiders are dominating information access and availability to the shareholders will be limited. With less information, foreign investors face an adverse selection problem. So they under invest in such stocks. Leuz, Lins, and Wa rnock (2008) found that foreign institutional investors prefer to invest in firms with better governance practices. In the present study, the analysis has been conducted in three perspectives: Dynamics of institutional holdings and its composition (2) Relationship between Institutional Holdings (explanatory variable) and the Corporate Governance Score (dependent variable) (3) Relationship between the Corporate Governance Score (explanatory variable) and Institutional Holdings (dependent variable) The major findings of the present study on the above aspects are summarized as under: The results outputs of the first segment depict that the institutional investors have increased their proportional holdings in the companies over the years. The number of sampled companies with higher institutional holdings has increased where as the number of companies with lower proportions of institutional holdings has decreased over the study period. Hence, institutional holdings have shown an increasing trend of investment in the sampled companies over the study period. As far as the dynamics of components of institutional investors is concerned, no specific trend is observed in investments of mutual funds. On the other hand Banks, Financial Institutions and Insurance Companies have shown declining trends of investments over the same period. Where as, foreign institutional investors have shown the increasing trends of investments in line with institutional holdings. The results outputs pertaining to the analysis of relationship between institutional holdings and corporate governance state that the larger proportions of institutional holdings have higher corporate governance scores in sampled companies and the smaller proportions of institutional holdings have lower governance scores in the sampled companies over the study period. Thus, very strong and positive relationship is established between institutional holdings and corporate governance. Hence, H01 is accepted. The results outputs of the section analyzing the relationship between corporate governance score and institutional holdings describe that the companies with higher governance scores have larger proportions of investments from institutional investors than the companies with lower governance scores. Therefore, very strong and positive relationship also exists between corporate governance score and institutional holdings. Hence, H02 is accepted. The inference can be drawn that institut ional holdings pre-empts good corporate governance still at other times, good corporate governance endues institutional investment in the firm. The results outputs pertaining to the analysis of relationship between mutual funds and corporate governance reveal out that smaller proportions of mutual funds holdings have higher governance score in the sampled companies and larger proportions of mutual funds holdings have lower governance scores in the sampled companies over the study period. Therefore, weak relationship exists between mutual funds holdings and corporate governance score. Hence, H01 is rejected. Alternatively, the results outputs pertaining to the analysis of relationship between corporate governance and components of institutional holdings reveal out that the companies with lower governance scores have larger proportions of mutual funds holdings to the companies with higher governance scores over the study period. Hence, weak relationship also exists between corporate governance score and mutual funds holdings. Hence, H02 is rejected. It can be inferred from the above outcomes that mutual funds companies do not observe good governance practices in companies and simultaneously, good governed companies also do not attract higher mutual funds investments. The results outputs as to the relationship between Banks, FIs and ICs and corporate governance depict that larger proportions of Banks, Financial Institutions and Insurance Companies holdings have higher governance score and smaller proportions of holdings have lower governance score in the sampled companies over the study period. Therefore, very strong and positive relationship is established between Banks, Financial Institutions and Insurance Companies holdings and corporate governance score. Hence, H01 is accepted. Similarly, the sampled companies with higher governance scores have larger proportions of Banks, FIs and ICs holdings to the companies with lower governance scores. Thus, very strong and positive relationship also exists between corporate governance score and Banks, FIs and ICs holdings. Hence, H02 is also accepted. The inference can be drawn on the basis of above results that Banks, FIs and ICs consider governance practices in companies while taking investment decision and alternatively, good governed companies also attract these investments. The results outputs pertaining to the relationship between FII holdings and corporate governance reveal out that the companies in which FIIs have larger proportions of holdings have higher governance score to the companies in which FIIs have smaller proportions of holdings. Therefore, very strong and positive relationship is observed between FII holdings and corporate governance score. Hence, H01 is accepted. Likewise, the sampled companies with higher governance scores have also larger proportions of Foreign Institutional Investors holdings. Thus, very strong and positive relationship also exists between corporate governance score and FII holdings. Hence, H02 is accepted. It can be inferred on the basis of above result that foreign institutional investors prefer to invest in firms with better governance practices and their investment do improve the governance practices in the companies. Resume The theoretical and empirical literature provides mixed evidence as to the relationship between institutional holdings and corporate governance. Some of the studies put forth the evidence that corporate governance is the significant factor for institutional investment decision and their significant investment improve the governance practices in companies, while the other studies state otherwise. Where as the research findings of the present study further validate, support and enrich the literature on positive association between institutional holdings and corporate governance. Likewise, the studies provide inconclusive evidence as to the relationship between mutual funds holdings and corporate governance. But the findings of present study state that neither the mutual funds care about the governance practices of companies or their presence improve them. Similarly, the empirical literature provides indeterminate evidence on the relationship between Banks, FIs and ICs and corporate governance. But the findings of present study observe very strong and positive relationship between the two. The empirical studies observe consistent results as to foreign institutional investors invest in better-governed companies but lacks evidence that their significant presence result in better governance. The findings of present study indicate that FIIs do not care for the corporate governance only, rather their higher stake ensure better governance too. Section C 7.8 Relationship between Institutional Holdings and Firm Performance: Review of Literature Pound (1988) explored the influence of institutional ownerships on firm performance and proposed three hypotheses on the relation between institutional shareholders and firm performance: efficient-monitoring hypothesis, conflict-of-interest hypothesis, and strategic-alignment hypothesis. The efficient-monitoring hypothesis says that institutional investors have greater expertise and can monitor management at lower cost than the small atomistic shareholders. Consequently, this argument predicts a positive relationship between institutional shareholding and firm performance. Holderness and Sheehan (1988) found that for a sample of 114 US firms controlled by a majority shareholder with more than 50% of shares, both Tobins Q and accounting profits are significantly lower for firms with individual majority owners than for firms with corporate majority owners. McConnell and Servaes (1990) found a strong positive relationship between the value of the firm and the fraction of shares held by institutional investors. They found that performance increases significantly with institutional ownership. Majumdar and Nagarajan (1994) found that levels of institutional investment are positively related to the current performance levels of firms. However, a less-stronger, though positive, effect is established between changes in performance levels and changes in institutional ownership. The results are based on a study investigating U.S. institutional investors investment strategy. Han and Suk (1998) found (for a sample of US firms) that stock returns are positively related to ownership by institutional investors, thus implying that these corporate owners are actively involved in the monitoring of incumbent management. Douma, Rejie and Kabir (2006) investigated the impact of foreign institutional investment on the performance of emerging market firms and found that there is positive effect of foreign ownership on firm performance. They also found impact of foreign investment on the business group affiliation of firms. Investor protection is poor in case of firms with controlling shareh olders who have ability to expropriate assets. The block shareholders affect the value of the firm and influence the private benefits they receive from the firm. Companies with such shareholders find it expensive to raise external funds. Studies examining the relationship between institutional holdings and firm performance in different countries (mainly OECD countries) have produced mixed results. Chaganti and Damanpour (1991) and Lowenstein (1991) find little evidence that institutional ownership is correlated with firm performance. Seifert, Gonenc and Wright (2005) study does not find a consistent relationship across countries. They conclude that their inconsistent results may reflect the fact that the influence of institutional investors on firm performance is location specific. The above studies generally consider institutional investors as a monolithic group. However, Shleifer and Vishnys (1986) as well as Pounds (1988) theorizations and later empirical examinations by McConnell and Servaes (1990) suggest that shareholders are differentiable and pursue different agendas. Jensen and Merkling (1976) also show that equity ownerships by different groups have different effects on the firm performance. Agrawal and Kno eber (1996), Karpoff et al. (1996), Duggal and Miller (1999) and Faccio and Lasfer (2000) find no such significant relation between institutional holdings and firm performance. In the present study, the analysis has been conducted in two perspectives: Institutional Holdings and Firm performance (b) Constituents of institutional holdings and Firm performance The major findings of the present study on the above aspects are summarized as under: The results outputs of the first segment indicate that there is no conclusive evidence as to larger proportions of institutional holdings in sampled companies have higher average return on networth or average net profit margin and smaller proportions of institutional holdings in sampled companies have lower average return on networth or average net profit margin over the study period. To the contrary, strong and positive relationship is observed between institutional holdings and return on capital employed as well as institutional holdings and earning per share. As the average return on capital employed and average earning per share are higher in the sampled companies with higher proportions of institutional holdings and lower in the sampled companies with lower proportions of institutional holdings over the study period. Therefore, it is stated that institutional holdings and two accounting returns (return on capital employed and earning per share) are significantly correlated where as institutional holdings and other two accounting returns (return on networth and net profit margin) are not related. Hence, there is no clear evidence that institutional holdings and accounting returns are related. Likewise, strong and positive relationship is observed between institutional holdings and Tobins q. But on the other hand, weak relationship is observed between institutional holdings and risk adjusted excess return. Therefore, institutional holdings and one market-based return are significantly correlated while the institutional holdings and another market-based return are not. Thus, the findings depict contradictory results as to the relationship between institutional holdings and market